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Abstract
Interbank markets are fundamental for bank liquidity management. In this
paper, we introduce a model of interbank trading with memory. Our model
reproduces features of preferential trading patterns in the e-MID market
recently empirically observed through the method of statistically validated
networks. The memory mechanism is used to introduce a proxy of trust
in the model. The key idea is that a lender, having lent many times to a
borrower in the past, is more likely to lend to that borrower again in the
future than to other borrowers, with which the lender has never (or has in-
frequently) interacted. The core of the model depends on only one parameter
representing the initial attractiveness of all the banks as borrowers. Model
outcomes and real data are compared through a variety of measures that
describe the structure and properties of trading networks, including number
of statistically validated links, bidirectional links, and 3-motifs. Refinements
of the pairing method are also proposed, in order to capture finite memory
and reciprocity in the model. The model is implemented within the Mason
framework in Java.
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1. Introduction
Well functioning interbank markets effectively channel liquidity from in-
stitutions with surplus funds to those in need and thus play a key role in
banks liquidity management and the transmission of monetary policy. Be-
fore the 2007-2008 financial crisis, liquidity and credit risks were perceived as
negligible in these markets. Nonetheless the collapse of interbank lending has
been a central feature of the subprime financial crisis. Liquidity hoarding and
trust evaporation have been identified as two important determinants of the
interbank market drying up during the crisis (Heider et al. (2009); Acharya
et al. (2013)). Haldane (2009) has advocated that the interbank market
freeze is a manifestation of the behaviour under stress of a complex, adap-
tive network, the complexity arising from the interconnectedness of players
via mutual exposures to each other, and the adaptation from the attempts of
agents to optimise interdependent strategies in the presence of (Knightian)
uncertainty. Several authors have since called for the adoption of network
analysis to fully understand the stability of the banking sector.
Recently some theoretical studies have considered the problem of network
formation in a financial system (Babus (2007), Allen and Babus (2008))
and also, from the perspective of network formation games (Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), Dutta et al. (2005), Bloch and Jackson (2007), Goyal and
Vega-Rodondo (2007)). The presence of a network underlying the bilateral
credit interactions occurring, for example, in an interbank market has a role
in the setting of both linkages that insure against liquidity risk and linkages
that can channel contagion risk.
The empirical network literature has aimed at characterising the observed
topology of the interbank market checking for regularities and stylised facts.
Studies have looked at several interbank markets around the world including
the Austrian (Boss et al. (2008)), the e-MID (Iori et al. (2008), Iazzetta and
Manna (2009)), the FedFunds (Bech and Atalay (2008)), the German (Craig
and Von Peter (2010), Brauning (2011)), the Mexican (Martinez-Jaramillo
et al. (2012)), and the Indian (Iyer and Peydro (2011)). Bech and Atalay
(2008) show that the network resulting from Fedfunds exchanges is sparse,
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exhibits small world phenomena and is disassortative. In addition reciprocity
and centrality measures are predictors of interest rate loans. The analyses
of tiering in the German interbank market in Craig and Von Peter (2010)
identifies a core-periphery structure. Martinez-Jaramillo et al. (2012) analy-
ses the Mexican banking network combining data from the payment systems
and interbank exposures. Other studies have attempted to quantify more
directly the impact of the network structure on the propagation of contagion
addressing a number of complementary issues including: the relationship
between the network structure of the interbank market and its resilience
to different kind of shocks (Gai et al. (2011), Iori et al. (2006), Battiston
et al. (2012), Lenzu and Tedeschi (2012), Georg (2013), Ladley (2013) ); the
effects of assets fire-sale (Nier et al. (2007)); roll-over risk and portfolio over-
laps (Anand et al. (2012), Caccioli et al. (2012)); impact of regulatory taxes
(Thurner and Poledna (2013), Poledna and Thurner (2014),) feedback loops
between the macroeconomy and the financial sector (Grilli et al. (2012)).
Two complementary approaches have been adopted. In one case the expo-
sure network is taken as exogenously given, either calibrated to real market
data or generated according to preset specifications. Stress-test experiments
are then performed and their effects monitored (Gai and Kapadia (2010),
Upper (2011), Caccioli et al. (2012)). Alternatively, in agent-based models,
behavioural rules are assigned to economic agents whose strategies determine
endogenously both the interbank exposure networks and default events (Iori
et al. (2006), Georg (2013), Ladley (2013)).
Our paper belongs to the agent-based model tradition and attempts to
identify simple behavioural rules that can explain features observed in real
markets. In particular we are interested in the e-MID market, the only
electronic market for interbank deposits in the euro area and the USA. In
a centralized interbank market, such as the e-MID, banks publicly quote
their offers to lend or borrow money at a given maturity. The quotes can be
anonymous but before finalizing the loan contract the lender has the right to
know the identity of the borrower and can refuse to finalize the transaction.
With this apparent lack of search frictions it is therefore worth investigating
what network structure is present.
While early studies on the e-MID market (Iori et al. (2008)) have revealed
a fairly random network at the daily scale, a non-random structure has been
uncovered for longer aggregation periods. Monthly and quarterly aggregated
data show that since the 1990s a high degree of bank concentration occurred
(Iazzetta and Manna (2009)), with fewer banks acting as global hubs for the
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whole network. The hubs tend to cluster together and a significant core-
periphery structure has been observed (Lux et al. (2013)). Lasting interbank
relationships, which remained stable throughout the financial crisis, have
been observed by Affinito (2011) and Temizsoy et al. (2014)1. A networked
structure of the e-MID market was observed in Hatzopoulos et al. (2013) by
using a methodology based on the detection of statistically validated net-
works (Tumminello et al. (2011)) that allows the researcher to control for
bank heterogeneity. In the cited study the networked nature of the e-MID
market was highlighted by selecting repeated credit interactions (specifically,
overnight loan contracts) between pairs of banks that were statistically in-
compatible with a null hypothesis of random pairing of the loans, which took
into account the transaction heterogeneity of the banks. In other words, the
underlying trading network of banks was assumed to be primarily driven by
the heterogeneity of the banks whereas the networked nature of some bi-
lateral relationships was associated with a dynamical over-expression of the
number of bilateral transactions.
Overall empirical studies of the e-MID data have identified important
properties of the market but have also shown that the e-MID interbank
network remained surprisingly stable during the subprime crisis (Lux and
Fricke (2013)) with a structural break only appearing after the Lehman de-
fault. These findings were confirmed, at the intraday scale, by Abraham et al.
(2013) who have uncovered regularities in the network growth process that
did not change during crisis. This indirectly suggests that the underlying
mechanisms driving the link formation are stable over time.
In the present study we introduce a stochastic model of preferential forma-
tion of bilateral credit relationships in a centralized heterogeneous credit mar-
ket. The market heterogeneity in number of credit transactions is assumed
to be exogenously given and the networked nature of credit relationships
is associated with the detection of over-expression of bilateral transactions
1 In these papers the strength of lending relationships is measured by the concentra-
tion of lending/borrowing activity between banks. More precisely, for every lender and
borrower a preference index is computed, equal to the ratio of total funds that a lender
(borrower) has lent to (borrowed from ) a borrower (lender) during a given period, over
the total amount of funds that the lender (borrower) has lent in (borrowed from) the
interbank market during the same period. This measure nonetheless does not take into
account the heterogeneity of the banking system and the fact that large banks may have
no alternative than to trade with each other if they need to exchange large volumes.
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with respect to a null hypothesis taking into account banks’ heterogeneity.
The numerical simulations of the model are calibrated with real data from
transactions of the e-MID market. The simulations of our model show the
existence of a dynamic of the networked credit relationships that mimics the
ones observed in real data. The analysis of simulated data is performed by
separately considering the role of lender aggressors from the role of the bor-
rower aggressors. The aggressor is the party proposing the setting of the loan
contract. After calibration, in both cases the number of networked relation-
ships observed in simulations agree well with the number observed in real
data, both for lender aggressors and borrower aggressors.
In addition to the detection of the mean number of networked relation-
ships, we also analyze the local nature of the networked relationships by
studying the triads or 3-motifs present in simulations and real data both for
the original and statistically validated networks. Triads or 3-motifs, i.e. iso-
morphic classes of subnetworks of 3 nodes, have been recently investigated
in empirical studies of the Interbank trading networks of the Netherlands
(Squartini et al. (2013)) and Italy (Bargigli et al. (2013)). We show that
real data presents an over-expression of some specific 3-motifs in several
of the investigated three-maintenance periods whereas the over-expression
is almost absent or only weakly present for lender-aggressor and borrower-
aggressor statistically validated networks respectively. In other words, the
real data presents a structuring of the local subgraphs that was not seen or
only weakly seen in simulations of the calibrated model.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our trading
model. In Section 3 we describe the method used to reveal preferential trad-
ing relationships between banks. In Section 4 we describe the investigated
database of transactions at e-MID interbank market. In Section 5 we com-
pare the trading networks obtained from simulations and from real data. In
Section 6 a refinement of the model is proposed, in order to introduce a finite
memory. Finally, in Section 7 we draw our conclusions.
2. A trading model with reinforcing memory
We investigate the credit relationships of bank loans in the e-MID market
by considering them as a network in which nodes are banks and a directional
link is set from bank i to bank j if i lent money to j, the weight of the link
being the number of times in which that event occurred in the considered
time period. We also distinguish between lender-aggressor and borrower-
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aggressor transactions, thus investigating in several cases two distinct types
of networks.
Here we propose a model of trading among banks that incorporates trust.
This model relies on the idea that if a bank Bj has lent many times to a
bank Bi (i, j = 1, · · · , n, where n is the number of banks) in the past then
it’s likely that it keeps doing so in the future, unless external conditions
change. Our model attempts to incorporate the intrinsic heterogeneity of
banks with respect to their willingness to lend or borrow in a given time
period. Therefore we shall distinguish two characteristic time scales in the
model. The first time scale, TM , is the one in which such willingness to
trade is defined, e.g. a maintenance period or a three-maintenance period.
Each bank can act as both a lender and a borrower in time window TM . To
best account for the heterogeneity of banks in our model we rely upon real
data, and set the number of transactions that each bank Bi is going to do as
a lender (borrower) in lender -aggressor transactions, Bl,lai (B
b,la
i ), and as a
lender (borrower) in borrower -aggressor transactions, Bl,bai (B
b,ba
i ) from our
real-data series of transactions.
The second time is an event time defining the order at which transac-
tions of the model sequentially occurs. It is therefore naturally described in
terms of time steps. So, a time step t of a certain time window TM indicates
that t transactions already occurred in the time window TM . The model
shall distinguish between borrower-aggressor and lender-aggressor transac-
tions. At each time step t of time window TM , we consider the outcome
of a binary random variable xlb, in order to decide if the next transaction
is a lender-aggressor or a borrower-aggressor transaction. Variable xlb takes
value “lender-aggressor” with probability pl(t), which is the fraction of the
total number of lender-aggressor transactions that remain to do in time win-
dow TM at time step t, and value “borrower-aggressor” otherwise. Once the
decision about the type (lender-aggressor or borrower-aggressor transaction)
of next transaction is made, the model indicates how the counterparts of the
transaction should be selected. We first focus on a lender-aggressor transac-
tion. To mimic a lender-aggressor transaction we assume that an order to
borrow is placed by a bank Bi that is randomly selected with probability
pb(Bi, t) ∝ Bb,lai (t). (1)
Quantity Bb,lai (t) is the number of transactions that bank Bi shall do in TM
as a borrower in lender-aggressor transactions, Bb,lai , minus the number of
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lender-aggressor transactions where it already acted as a borrower at time
step t of TM . Once the borrower is selected, we randomly select a bank Bj
to be the counterpart of the transaction, the lender, with probability
pl(Bj, t|Bi) ∝ Bl,laj (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]
, (2)
where Bl,laj (t) is the number of transactions that a bank Bj is willing to do
in TM as a lender in lender-aggressor transactions, B
l,la
j , minus the number
of lender-aggressor transactions in which it already acted as a lender at time
step t. Quantity NBj→Bi(t) is the total number of transactions in which Bj
lent money to Bi since the beginning of the simulations, in spite of the type
of transaction, eventually including transactions from Bj to Bi among the t
trades that already occurred at time step t of TM . Finally, w is a parameter
equal for all the banks, which represents a common level of attractiveness of
borrowers. This parameter is particularly important at the beginning of a
simulation, when NBj→Bi(t) is equal to zero or it is very small. It is important
to note two things about w. Firstly, it acts as a randomization parameter. In
fact a large value of w would prevent the memory mechanism from working
effectively, and the result will be a random network without preferential links.
Secondly, we may use parameter w to include reputation in our model, by
varying it across banks, and over time; however, this possibility is out of the
scope of the present paper and will be explored elsewhere. The two equations
above indicate that, according to our model, the probability that a (lender-
aggressor) transaction occurs from A (the lender) to B (the borrower) at
time step t is
p(Bj → Bi, t) = pb(Bi, t) pl(Bj, t|Bi)
=
Bb,lai (t)∑n
k=1B
b,la
k (t)
· B
l,la
j (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]∑n
q=1B
l,la
q (t)
[
w +NBq→Bi(t)
] . (3)
The way in which we model borrower-aggressor transactions is slightly
different, because the lender has always the possibility to refuse to trade
with a specific borrower. The model works as follows. A lender, Bj, is
randomly selected with probability
pl(Bj, t) ∝ Bl,baj (t), (4)
that is, with probability proportional to its willingness to lend in a borrower-
aggressor transaction at time step t of time window TM . Then a borrower, Bi,
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is selected with probability proportional to its willingness to borrow as the
aggressor at time step t of time window TM , that is pb(Bi, t) ∝ Bb,bai (t). So
far, the selection of lender and borrower occurred independently. However,
once the borrower is selected, the lender, Bj has a certain probability to
accept borrower Bi as counterpart in the transaction. This probability is set
to be proportional to the attractiveness w plus the degree of trust that lender
Bj associates with bank Bi. Therefore the probability that Bj lends to Bi
at time step t of time window T , conditioned to the fact that Bj has been
selected as the lender is:
pb(Bi, t|Bj) ∝ Bb,bai (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]
. (5)
If the two banks do not end up trading then another borrower should be
randomly selected, and so on, until the lender Bj finds an acceptable coun-
terpart. In our simulations, we work in the space of transactions2, and, from
the perspective of transactions, the process of searching a suitable counter-
part of lender Bj is equivalent to randomly selecting a borrower Bi with
probability
pb(Bi, t|Bj) =
Bb,bai (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]∑n
m=1B
b,ba
m (t)
[
w +NBj→Bm(t)
] . (6)
Therefore, in the case of borrower-aggressor transaction, we obtain that the
probability that a transaction occurs between a lender Bj and a borrower Bi
is given by:
p(Bj → Bi, t) = pl(Bj, t) pb(Bi, t|Bj)
=
Bl,baj (t)∑n
q=1B
l,ba
q (t)
· B
b,ba
i (t)
[
w +NBj→Bi(t)
]∑n
m=1B
b,ba
m (t)
[
w +NBj→Bm(t)
] . (7)
The memory mechanism that we introduced in the model is based on the
number of transactions between banks in the past. However, such a mecha-
nism could be easily be adapted to take into account volumes: it is sufficient
to replace, in all the equations above, NBj→Bi(t) with the volume VBj→Bi(t)
that bank Bj lent to bank Bi in the past.
2In fact time is just an event time increasing as an integer variable describing successive
transactions
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3. Statistically validated networks
We asses the statistical significance of the observed interbank credit re-
lationships by comparing the empirically observed number of transactions
between each pair of banks against a random null hypothesis taking into ac-
count the trading heterogeneity of the system. As discussed in Hatzopoulos
et al. (2013), we consider as null hypothesis a probabilistic description based
on the hypergeometric distribution. It provides analytical results that are
only approximated because the probabilistic description does not avoid the
possibility that a bank can lend money to itself.
For each link in the network, we perform a statistical test to check whether
two banks preferentially traded in a given three-maintenance period. Our
test is done by using a recently proposed method (Li et al. (2014)) that is
a directional variant of the method presented in Tumminello et al. (2011).
The statistical test is implemented as follows. For each three-maintenance
period, we define NT as the total number of trades among banks in the
system and focus on two banks i and j to check whether i preferentially lent
money to j. Let us call nil the number of times bank i lent money to any
other bank, and njb the number of times bank j borrowed money from any
other bank. Assuming that nijlb is the number of times bank i lent money to
j then the probability of observing such nijlb trades, assuming that j borrows
money randomly and i lends money randomly, is given by the hypergeometric
distribution
H(nijlb |NT , nil, njb) =
( nil
nijlb
) (NT−nil
njb−nijlb
)
(NT
njb
) . (8)
We use this probability to associate a p-value with the observed number
nijlb of trades from bank i to bank j as p(n
ij
lb) =
∑min[nil,njb]
X=nijlb
H(X|NT , nil, njb),
that is the probability of observing by chance a number of trades from i
to j equal to nijlb or larger. This p-value is calculated by taking the sum of
probabilities over the right tail of the hypergeometric distribution. Therefore
a “small”3 value of the p-value statistically indicates that the link from i (the
lender) to j (the borrower) is over-represented, in terms of number of loans,
with respect to the null hypothesis of random trading. Analogously we can
3This point will be quantitatively discussed later in this section.
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statistically validate a link between i and j that is under-represented with
respect to a random null hypothesis by taking into account the left tail of
the hypergeometric distribution. In this case one should compute the left-tail
p-value as p(nijlb) =
∑nijlb
X=0H(X|NT , nil, njb).
The hypergeometric distribution can be used to describe variable nijlb be-
cause the problem can be mapped into an urn model Feller (1968), Hatzopou-
los et al. (2013). Note that mapping the problem of randomizing bank loans
onto an urn model is done at the cost of removing the constraint that a bank
cannot lend money to itself. This means that our analytical solution for the
random system is an approximation of what we would obtain by randomly
rewiring data and enforcing the condition of no self loans.
If we were just interested in calculating p-values of over-representation
for all the directed edges, E in our network, then we should run E statistical
tests. To avoid a large number of false positive validated links, due to the
large number E of statistical tests, it is advisable to consider a method to
control the family-wise error rate. This control can be done by applying the
so-called Bonferroni correction. This correction requires that the univariate
level of statistical significance, e.g. pu = 0.01, is corrected in presence of
multiple tests.
3.1. Simultaneous test of over- and under-expression
Here we investigate simultaneously over-expressed and under-expressed
links of a network. This clearly affects the way in which the statistical
threshold should be corrected for multiple comparison, because it changes
the total number of tests. Below we show a simple way to compute a statis-
tical threshold pm in this case.
Let us consider a specific time period — e.g. a three-maintenance period
a — and call Ea the number of pairs of banks that actually traded at least
once in that time period; call La (Ba) the number of banks that have done
at least one trade as a lender (borrower) in the time window, and call NBLa
the number of banks that have done at least one trade as a lender and at
least one trade as a borrower in the a-th time period.
The number of tests for over-expression that we need to run is Ea. In
general Ea ≤ La × Ba − NBLa . In fact, the quantity La × Ba − NBLa gives
the maximum expected number of links, given a certain number of lenders
and borrowers. However, many of these links might not actually exist in the
network, because trades between some bank pairs may not occur. Therefore,
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for some i and j it is possible that nijlb = 0, which, necessarily, cannot indicate
an over representation of loans from i to j, and therefore should not be tested
for over representation. However, nijlb = 0 is an excellent candidate to test
under representation of loans from i to j—that is to test whether i avoids
to lend money to j or j avoids to borrow money from i. This means that
such cases should be included in the test for under representation. So, in
the case of under representation, we have to run the test for all the pairs of
active banks in the system (La × Ba) minus the cases in which lender and
borrower are the same bank, that is NBLa . Therefore La × Ba − NBLa is the
number of tests of under-representation that we have to run. As a result,
the total number of tests, for both under- and over-representation, in a given
time window, is
Ta = Ea + La ×Ba −NBLa . (9)
It is worth mentioning that a possible alternative would be Ta = 2(La×Ba−
NBLa ). However we believe that this choice is unnecessariliy conservative as
it involves testing the null hypothesis in cases that are clearly not relevant
for the over-expression analysis (those with nijlb = 0).
In the present study, we investigate simultaneously over-expressed and
under-expressed links. This is done to obtain results consistent with the
results already presented in Hatzopoulos et al. (2013). However, we will
show only the results about over-expressed links. The investigation of under-
expressed links is left for a future study.
4. Data
Interbank markets can be organized in different ways: physically on the
floor, by bilateral interactions, or on electronic platforms. In Europe, in-
terbank trades are executed in all these ways. The only electronic market
for Interbank Deposits in the euro area and USA is called e-MID. It was
founded in Italy in 1990 for Italian Lira transactions and became denomi-
nated in Euros in 1999. When the financial crisis started, the market play-
ers were 246, belonging to 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland,
Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Portugal. As shown in Fig
1 and Fig. 2, the number of transactions at e-MID decreased, whereas the
volume increased, until the beginning of the financial crisis. According to the
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European Central Bank e-MID accounted, before the crisis, for 17% of total
turnover in unsecured money markets in the Euro Area. The last report on
money markets (European Central Bank, 2011), recorded around 10% of the
total overnight turnovers. Trading in e-MID starts at 8 a.m. and ends at 6
p.m. Contracts of different maturities, from one day to a year can be traded
but the overnight segment (defined as the trade for a transfer of funds to be
effected on the day of the trade and to return on the subsequent business day
at 9 : 00 a.m.) represents more than 90% of the transactions. One distinctive
feature of the platform is that it is fully transparent. Trades are public in
terms of maturity, rate, volume, and time. Buy and sell proposals appear
on the platform with the identity of the bank posting them (the quoter may
choose to post a trade anonymously but this option is rarely used). Market
participants can choose their counterparts. An operator willing to trade can
pick a quote and manifest his wish to close the trade while the quoter has
the option to reject an aggression. The database is composed by the records
of all transactions registered in the period from 25-Jan-1999 to 7-Dec-2009.
Each line contains a code labeling the quoting bank, i.e. the bank that pro-
poses a transaction, and the aggressor bank, i.e. the bank that accepts a
proposed transaction. The rate the lending bank will receive is expressed per
year; the volume of the transaction is expressed in millions of Euros. The
banks are reported together with a code representing their country and, for
Italian banks, a label that encodes their size, as measured in terms of total
assets. A label indicates the side of the aggressor bank, i.e. whether the
latter is lending/selling (“Sell”) or borrowing/buying (“Buy”) capitals to or
from the quoting bank. Other labels indicate the dates and the exact time
of the transaction and the maturity of the contract. We consider the dataset
obtained by considering only the overnight (“ON”) and the overnight long
(“ONL”) contracts. The latter is the version of the ON when more than
one night/day is present between two consecutive business day. This is the
same dataset already investigated by Hatzopoulos et al. (2013). It is worth
pointing out that in the present study and in Hatzopoulos et al. (2013) we
limit our investigation to transactions occurring only between Italian banks.
The period of time in which credit institutions have to comply with the
minimum reserve requirements is called the reserve maintenance period. Dur-
ing each reserve maintenance period minimum reserve levels are calculated
on the basis of banks’ own balance sheet. Each reserve maintenance period
is usually equivalent to one calendar month, i.e. about 23 trading days. In
the investigations we present below, we have aggregated the maintenance
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periods in groups of three. In fact, these aggregated periods better capture
the natural economic cycles that are usually organized on a nearly 3-monthly
basis. We therefore will consider 44 three-maintenance periods ranging from
25-Jan-1999 to 07-Dec-20094.
5. Comparison between model simulations and real data
5.1. Original and Bonferroni networks
In Figures 1 and 2, the number of links in the original and Bonferroni
networks of banks obtained by running and analyzing simulations of our
model5, for different values of parameter w, are compared with the number
of links in the original and Bonferroni networks associated with real data
of overnight transactions among Italian banks. Quantities Bl,lai , B
b,la
i , B
l,ba
i ,
and Bb,bai (i = 1, · · · , n), which are used in the model to set the initial
willingness of bank A to trade as a lender and as a borrower, in the two
types of transactions—borrower-aggressor and lender-aggressor—are those
observed in real data. The time window TM is equal to one three-maintenance
period. The figures show that our model is capable to generate a networked
market whenever parameter w is small enough. Indeed middle panels of
Figures 1 and 2 show that small values of parameter w imply large numbers
of validated links. This is in agreement with the interpretation of w as
a randomization parameter that, when large, can impair the effectiveness
of the memory mechanism. Figures 1 and 2 show that the setting of the
networked over-expressed connections is rapid involving one or two three-
maintenance periods. Such an abrupt change in the number of validated
links indicates that the memory mechanism becomes fully effective in a few
time windows. The figures also show that, when w is small, the number of
links in the Bonferroni networks of the simulations strongly correlates with
the total number of transactions. This correlation is explained by noting that
4It should be noted that the first three-maintenance period covers the time period from
25-Jan-1999 to 23-Mar-1999, thus involving a number of trading days which is reduced of
a factor of about one third with respect to all the other three-maintenance periods.
5Results presented in this section were obtained through an implementation of the
model written by using Mathematica. The model has also been developed using Java
and the MASON library for multi-agent modeling, and is being currently tested. The
implementation within the Java/Mason framework will allow to include and integrate
our model into the interbank sector of the CRISIS macro-financial software library. A
description of the implementation in Java/Mason is provided in Appendix A.
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small values of w allow the memory mechanism to determine and enhance
even small deviations from random matching, and such small deviations are
better detected by the statistical validation method when the statistics, that
is, the total number of transactions, is large. On the contrary, larger values
of w may easily destroy small deviations from random matching, and the
detection of larger deviations is less affected by varying statistics.
According to the number of validated links, we obtain a good agreement
between simulations and real data if w is set equal to 1. Specifically, we com-
pared the average (over the 44 three-maintenance periods) number of vali-
dated links from simulations and real data through a two-sample Student’s
t-test 6. The result is a two-tailed p-value of 0.047 for the lender-aggressor
data set and a p-value of 0.156 for the borrower-aggressor data set, indi-
cating that the hypothesis that the two samples, from simulations and real
data, have the same average cannot be rejected at 1% significance level. It
is important to note that the process of statistically validating links is done
independently for lender-aggressor and borrower-aggressor transactions, in
both real data and simulations. Therefore the fact that one value of param-
eter w, w = 1, allows one to replicate, on average, the number of validated
links in a three-maintenance period for both lender-aggressor and borrower-
aggressor transactions is not a consequence of the validation procedure. The
two datasets of borrower-aggressor and lender-aggressor transactions are an-
alyzed independently one of the other. The results obtained from simula-
tions with w = 1 indicate that the tradeoff between memory and the overall
attractiveness of banks might be independent of the type of transactions,
lender-aggressor or borrower-aggressor, in which they are involved.
5.2. Degree of similarity of the networks
Another feature of the model is that the memory mechanism is cumulated,
that is, the probability that two banks end up trading depends on the their
trading history since the beginning of the simulation. In practice, this feature
introduces a certain degree of similarity between transactions, and, therefore,
between validated networks, obtained at different time windows TM . We
quantify this degree of similarity through the Jaccard index between any two
6The test assumes that the two sets have equal sample size and unequal variance, and
the p-value is obtained through 106 bootstrap replicas of data
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Figure 1: Top three panels: number of links in the original (top) and Bonferroni (central)
network associated with lender-aggressor transactions simulated according to the presented
model, for several values of parameter w. Specifically we have considered w = 0.01 (blue
circles), w = 1 (green circles) and w = 100 (magenta circles). The red circles refer
to the empirical data. The bottom panel shows the ratio between number of links in
the Bonferroni and original network. Bottom three panels: total number of transactions
associated to the links of the original (top) and Bonferroni (central) network. The bottom
panel shows the ratio between number of transactions in the Bonferroni and original
network.
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Figure 2: Top three panels: number of links in the original (top) and Bonferroni (central)
network associated with borrower-aggressor transactions simulated according to the pre-
sented model, for several values of parameter w. Specifically we have considered w = 0.01
(blue circles), w = 1 (green circles) and w = 100 (magenta circles). The red circles refer
to the empirical data. The bottom panel shows the ratio between number of links in
the Bonferroni and original network. Bottom three panels: total number of transactions
associated to the links of the original (top) and Bonferroni (central) network. The bot-
tom panel shows the ratio between number of transactions in the Bonferroni and original
network.
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validated networks, g1 and g2, obtained at different time windows:
J(g1, g2) =
|E1 ∩ E2|
|E1 ∪ E2| , (10)
where |E1 ∩ E2| is the number of directed links that appear in both vali-
dated networks, and |E1 ∪ E2| is the number of links that appear in either
networks. In Fig.3, we report the matrix of Jaccard indices between ev-
ery pair of validated networks obtained from real data across the 44 three-
maintenance periods (left panels), and the corresponding matrix obtained
from simulations of the model with w = 1 across the corresponding 44 time
windows (right panels). Top (bottom) panels correspond to lender-aggressor
(borrower-aggressor) transactions. The pattern of Jaccard index across the
44 three-maintenance periods analyzed for real data is similar to the one ob-
served for simulations. Overall, the analysis of the Jaccard index indicates
that validated networks obtained from simulations present a higher degree
of similarity, i.e. of memory, than those obtained from real data. This ev-
idence may suggest that the memory mechanism that we introduced in the
model, which invoke the fact that banks keep memory of the whole set of
their transactions in the past, may be suitably varied in such a way to require
finite memory of banks. This can easily be done by redefining the quantity
NA→B(t), which is used to incorporate memory in the model, as the num-
ber of transactions in which bank A lent money to bank B in the past Q
time-windows. This refinement is considered Section 6. Another mechanism
that may compete with finite memory to explain the differences between real
data and simulations, which are observed in Fig.3, is the nature of parameter
w. This randomization parameter is maintained constant throughout the 44
time windows of a simulation. However, if we think about w as a parameter
that also incorporates market information, such as, for instance, market liq-
uidity, it becomes reasonable to assume that w can vary over time, in order
to mimic the existence of different “states” of the market.
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Figure 3: Matrix of Jaccard indices between validated networks associated with real data
of overnight transactions among italian banks (left panels) and between validated net-
works associated with simulations of our model realized across 44 time windows with
parameter w = 1.00 (right panels). Lender-aggressor (borrower-aggressor) transactions
are considered in the top panels (bottom panels).
The differences between empirical and simulated networks can also be in-
vestigated on the original and simulated networks over the 44 three-maintenance
periods. In Fig. 4 we show the the Jaccard index of lender-aggressor net-
works estimated between all pairs of three-maintenance periods. Specifically,
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the left panel shows the Jaccard index between original networks whereas
the right panel shows the Jaccard index between simulated networks with
w=1. Also at the level of the original network the simulations of the model
well describe the degree of network persistence observed in real data.
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Figure 4: Lender-aggressor networks. Matrix of Jaccard index of links between all pairs of
networks of three-maintenance periods. The left panel shows the Jaccard index between
original networks. The right panel shows the Jaccard index between the corresponding
simulated networks with w=1.
5.3. Bidirectional links
Our model does not involve any mechanism of reciprocity. Indeed the
memory term NA→B(t) only counts the number of times in which bank A lent
to bank B in the past, and, therefore, does not include information about the
number of times in which A borrowed money from B in the past. This lack
of reciprocity implies that a bidirectional link, either statistically validated
or not, may appear in an outcome of the model only by chance. To check if
our hypothesis of no reciprocity is consistent with real data, we compared the
number of bidirectional links, in the original and Bonferoni network. Table
1 shows that the average number of bidirectional links observed in real data
is rather small, in both the original and Bonferroni network. Specifically
the fraction of bidirectional links is always smaller than 8% in real data.
Such a small value justifies neglecting reciprocity in the basic setting of our
model. However, our results show that the average number of bidirectional
19
links in empirical data is always larger than the corresponding number of
bidirectional links obtained from simulations with parameter w = 1, in both
lender-aggressor and borrower-aggressor datasets.
Table 1: Bidirectional links in real data and simulations with w = 1
Original network Bonferroni network
Data type Mean Std. Perc. Mean Std. Perc.
Lender aggr. (data) 210.8 111.9 7.6% 1.64 1.59 1.7%
Lender aggr. (sim.) 202.5 93.0 6.1% 0.07 0.25 0.07%
Borrower aggr. (data) 91.1 67.2 4.7% 0.45 0.85 1.2%
Borrower aggr. (sim.) 88.5 61.8 3.8% 0.00 0.00 0.0%
The results shown in Table 1 suggest that it may be worth considering
the possibility of introducing a reciprocity mechanism as a refinement of our
model. This could be done by weighting the memory term NA→B(t) with
NB→A(t):
NλA↔B(t) = λNA→B(t) + (1− λ)NB→A(t),
where λ is a parameter ranging between 0 and 1. The quantity NλA↔B(t)
can be used in place of NA→B(t) in all the equations of the model in order
to introduce a degree of reciprocity, which is controlled by parameter λ.
Intuitively, the value of λ should be quite close to 1, in order to replicate
the (rather small) average number of bidirectional validated links observed
in real data.
5.4. 3-motifs
We have also compared the original and statistically validated networks
from real data and from simulations according to the fraction of 13 different
types of 3-motifs that can be present in a network.
In Fig. 5 we show the 13 different types of isomorphic 3-motifs. There
are different ways to label 3-motifs. In the present paper we use the labeling
of FANMOD program.
Fig.6 shows the number of three-maintenance periods in which each 3-
motif type turns out to be over-expressed, under-expressed, normally ex-
pressed, and not present in the original (top panels) and Bonferroni (bottom
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Figure 5: The 13 isomorphic directed 3-motifs. The numeric code is the one used by the
FANMOD program.
panels) networks obtained from real data of lender-aggressor overnight trans-
actions among Italian banks (left panels) and from lender-aggressor transac-
tions of a realization of our model with w = 1. A comparison of top panels
of Fig. 6 indicates that the number of three maintenance periods in which
each motif is normally expressed in the original network obtained from sim-
ulations is larger than the corresponding number obtained from real data.
The only exception is motif 174. This motif is normally expressed in one
three-maintenance period in the original network from simulations, while it
is normally expressed in four three-maintenance periods in the original net-
work from real data. It involves two bidirectional links plus one directional
link that closes the triangle. The reason why it is under-expressed in most
of three-maintenance periods in the original network of both real data and
simulations may be that the lack of reciprocity in the third connection is
disfavored with respect to full reciprocity, which is accounted by motif 238.
This motif is indeed over-expressed in most three-maintenance periods in
both real data and simulations. Taking into account the fact that, on aver-
age, the frequency of motifs 174 (< 1%) and 238 (< 0.1%) is small in both
simulations and real data, results observed for these two 3-motifs may be the
result of the competition of two interdependent factors. The first one is that
a p-value is automatically associated with a motif by the tool FANMOD, by
comparing the frequency of the given motif in the network with its frequency
in 1000 networks obtained by randomly rewiring the original one, without
taking into account the link weight, that is, the number of transactions as-
sociated with a directed link between two banks. The second factor is the
heterogeneity of banks, which makes it likely that two large banks interact
with others just because they trade a lot, both as a borrower and as a lender.
This result is also supported by the results reported in the bottom panels of
Fig. 6, where 3-motifs in the Bonferroni network of over-expressed trading
is concerned. Indeed, motifs 174 and 238 never appear in the Bonferroni
network from simulations, and they do not appear in, at least, 35 out of 44
three-maintenance periods in real data. It is also to mention that, for the
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motifs that appear in Bonferroni network, the number of times in which any
three-motif is either over- or under-expressed in the networks obtained from
simulations is rather small. On the contrary, in real data we notice that
some 3-motifs labeled as 6, 12, 36, and 174 are over-expressed in at least
10 out of 44 three-maintenance periods. Such a difference between real data
and simulations, which is observed in both the original networks and Bon-
ferroni networks, suggests the presence of a non-trivial structure of nodes,
e.g. communities, in real data, which is not captured in the model. A similar
outcome is observed when we focus on borrower-aggressor transactions (see
Fig.7), though, in this case, the statistics is much smaller than in the case
of lender-aggressor transactions, especially in the Bonferroni network, and,
therefore, the impact of banks heterogeneity is stronger.
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Figure 6: Number of three-maintenance periods (out of 44) in which each three-motif type
(indicated in the horizontal axis) is over-expressed, under-expressed, normally expressed,
and not present in the original (top left panel) and Bonferroni networks (bottom left panel)
associated with real data of lender-aggressor and with corresponding lender-aggressor
transactions from simulations of the model with w = 1 (original (top left) and Bonferroni
(bottom left)). Over-expressions and under expressions are obtained by performing a
multiple hypothesis test correction. The over/under expression of a three motif indicates
that the corresponding p-value provided by FANMOD was smaller than 0.01/(13 · 44),
where 13 is the number of three-motif types and 44 is the number of three-maintenance
periods investigated. 23
Figure 7: Number of three-maintenance periods (out of 44) in which each three-motif type
(indicated in the horizontal axis) is over-expressed, under-expressed, normally expressed,
and not present in the original (top left panel) and Bonferroni networks (bottom left panel)
associated with real data of borrower-aggressor and with borrower-aggressor transactions
from simulations of the model with w = 1 (original (top left) and Bonferroni (bottom
left)). Over-expressions and under expressions are obtained by performing a multiple
hypothesis test correction. The over/under expression of a three motif indicates that the
corresponding p-value provided by FANMOD was smaller than 0.01/(13 · 44), where 13
is the number of three-motif types and 44 is the number of three-maintenance periods
investigated. 24
6. A model with limited memory
The existence of a steady state in our model is a key aspect to tackle on.
While a detailed analysis of the model’s long-run results is still on the way,
a qualitative discussion can already give some answers and suggests how to
modify our assumption about the control parameters. When the heterogene-
ity of banks’ transactions is constant over time, it is quite straightforward to
figure out the evolution of the system. Let us consider a system consisting
of just one bank A which acts as borrower and a set of banks {Φ}. Since the
bank B with higher number of transactions to execute in Φ is more likely to
be selected as a partner from bank A, the parameter NA→B(t) will start in-
creasing. This process will go on and as t→∞ the system will move towards
a deterministic steady state, where bank A only transacts with bank B. The
situation is different when the heterogeneity in the number of transactions is
not constant, like in our empirical data, for example. In this case, even start-
ing from the previous stationary state, we can imagine a shock of some nature
hitting bank B, which then has to drastically reduce its number of transac-
tions. In order to complete its own transactions, bank A will have to fall
back to another relationship which, given enough time can compete with the
new one. Therefore, when dealing with heterogeneous and time-dependent
number of transactions we should expect a long-run state characterized by
a series of metastable states. However, the time scale for this switching can
be extremely large when compared with reality, where banks have to react
quickly to the fast dynamics of market state. Along this line, it also appears
unrealistic to assume that all the events occurred a long time in the past
influence the current behavior of a bank. For all these reasons, we are going
to investigate how our model changes if we include a memory parameter to
take into account only transactions between bank A and bank B in the past
Q time-windows. Specifically, we consider two values of parameter Q, one
is Q = 4 three-maintenance periods, which corresponds more or less to one
year, and the other one is Q = 1 three-maintenance period, which means a
period of roughly three months. In Fig. 8 we compare the number of sta-
tistically validated links that result from simulations with different values of
parameter w and Q. The figure shows that the impact of finite memory on
the number of validated links is marginal, at least with respect to the impact
of parameter w. This result may be due to the competition of different fac-
tors. First of all, the heterogeneity of banks used in all the simulations, as
measured by the number of transactions per three-maintenance period per
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bank, is the one observed in real data, and may affect in a similar way all the
simulations through its changes across the 44 three-maintenance periods. A
second factor may be the absence of external shocks in the simulations, which
avoids abrupt changes in the behavior of banks, which turns out to be self-
replicating at different time scales. A third factor concerns the size of finite
memory that we have considered. It’s possible that a time scale of 1 three-
maintenance period is not sufficiently small to impair the full effectiveness of
the memory mechanism.
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Figure 8: Average number of statistically validated links associated with simulations of
transaction data across 44 three-maintenance periods at varying values of parameter w
for different settings of the finite memory parameter Q: memory of the full set of past
transactions, Q = 4 three-maintenance periods in the past, and Q = 1 three-maintenance
period in the past. Error bars correspond to one standard deviation of the average. Top
panel refers to lender-aggressor transactions, while bottom panel to borrower-aggressor
transactions.The solid red line is the average value observed in real data of transactions
among italian banks, and dashed lines, indicate the average plus and minus one standard
deviation of the average.
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The presence of a memory impacts the degree of persistence of the simu-
lated networks. In Fig. 9 we show the contour plots of the Jaccard index of
links between all pairs of three-maintenance periods. The right panel shows
the Jaccard index between original networks. The central panel shows the
Jaccard index between simulated networks with Q=1 and w=1. The left
panel shows the Jaccard index between simulated networks with Q=4 and
w=1. From these plots it is quite evident that the persistence of links is not
dramatically affected by the time window over which the level of memory
extends in the past, although the case when Q=1 and w=1 shows overall
lower levels of similarity of simulated networks, while the case when Q=4
and w=1 result is quite similar to empirical data. This would indicate that
empirical data is better reproduced when the memory memory extends over
the past, although it might not be necessary to have a full memory, as in the
model of section 2.
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Figure 9: Lender-aggressor networks. Contour plots of the Jaccard index of links between
all pairs of three-maintenance periods. The right panel shows the Jaccard index between
original networks. The central panel shows the Jaccard index between simulated networks
with Q = 1 and w = 1. The right panel shows the Jaccard index between simulated
networks with Q = 4 and w = 1.
7. Conclusions
We have introduced a simple model with memory to describe the forma-
tion of a networked structure of the e-MID market, which has been observed
by Hatzopoulos et al. (2013). Such a structure presents preferential patterns
of trading between banks incompatible with the null hypothesis of random
pairing of banks. The null hypothesis takes into account the heterogeneity
of banks, and so does the model. In fact, the model works at two differ-
ent time scales, one at the level of single transactions between banks, and
28
another one, at which the heterogeneity of banks is set, according to their
willingness to trade, as borrowers or lenders. The time scale considered in
the paper is a three-maintenance period. The memory mechanism assumes
that the probability that a lender and a borrower end up trading at a given
time step depends on their overall willingness to trade (their heterogeneity)
times the sum of two terms. The first one is the number of times in which
the borrower borrowed from the lender in the past, and the other term, w,
represents an overall attractiveness of borrowers. High values of parameter
w (w > 10) disfavor the appearance of preferential patterns of trading. On
the other hand, small values of w (w < 0.1) tend to freeze the market in a
network in which most of the transactions occur between banks that have
heavily traded in the past. So, low values of w allow to model a status of
the market in which “trust” (and “distrust”) dominates the process of bank
pairing. A high degree of agreement between model and real data, in terms
of number of preferential links observed over time, is attained by setting
w = 1. It is interesting to note that, while the occurrence of preferential
links is tested separately and independently for the set of borrower-aggressor
and lender-aggressor transactions, the value w = 1 that we used to simu-
late (at the same time) borrower aggressor and lender-aggressor transactions
provides an excellent agreement with both sets of data. A comparison be-
tween the statistically validated networks obtained from simulations and real
data, through the measure of the lagged Jaccard index among networks, in-
dicates that, on average, the networked structure observed in a realization
of the model is more persistent over the 44 simulated time windows than
the networked structure observed in real data. This fact may be due to the
relatively long time horizon of 11 years that we have considered, in which
the e-MID market went through different phases, including a severe crisis,
while parameter w has been kept constant throughout the 44 simulated time
windows. The parameter Q allows one to set the level of memory of banks.
Three levels of Q have been considered, Q = 1 three-maintenance period,
Q = 4 three-maintenance periods and Q = ∞, which corresponds to the
entire set of transactions since the beginning of a simulation. The compari-
son between model outcomes obtained with these values of Q indicates that
the model is not significantly affected by this parameter, at least in the in-
vestigated time horizon of 44 three-maintenance periods and in terms of the
number of observed preferential connections. Model outcomes and real data
have also been compared in terms of number of bidirectional links observed
in the original and Bonferroni networks. The presence of bidirectional links
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is small (< 10%) in both real data and simulations, indicating a low degree
of reciprocity in the system. However, on average, model outcomes present
a smaller number of bidirectional links than real data. A simple method to
introduce a tunable level of reciprocity has been proposed, but not investi-
gated, in consideration of the low number of bidirectional links observed in
real data. Finally, we have compared real data and simulations in terms of
the presence of 3-motifs in the original and statistically validated networks.
3-motifs are simple structures that classify the 13 possible ways in which
three nodes can be connected in a directed network. This analysis indicates
that the presence of 3-motifs in the networks associated with model realiza-
tions is, on average, more similar to the one expected in a random network
than the one observed in real data. This result suggests the moderate pres-
ence of a structure of connections in real data, such as clusters of banks, that
is not captured by our model of random pairing with memory.
Appendix A. Details about Java Implementation
A version of the model has been developed using Java and the MASON
library for multi-agent modeling (Luke et al. (2005)). The implementation
within the Java/Mason framework will allow to include and integrate our
model into the interbank sector of the CRISIS macro-financial software li-
brary and in this appendix we briefly outline the structure of our Java/Mason
software. Besides the Model and Scheduler MASON classes, our model de-
fines three new classes: Transaction, Bank and Market. The class Transac-
tion basically represents a credit line between a Bank which acts as a lender
and a Bank which acts as a borrower. It contains data members to store the
lending bank, the borrowing bank, the total number of transactions occurred
between these two banks since the beginning of the simulation (i.e. the
memory parameter introduced in eq.(2), and also the number of transactions
they had in the current period of the simulation (identified with a three-
maintenance period). Along with the appropriate getters and setters, this
class also provides a member function to increase by one both the marginal
and cumulative transactions whenever a new deal between two banks occurs.
The class Bank has data members to hold the number of transactions each
bank wants to do as borrower and as lender (two variables for the lender-
aggressor scheme and two for the borrower-aggressor one) and four ArrayLists
to store the Transaction objects describing the bank’s credit lines with all
the other banks. It also contains methods to call when a new Transaction
30
occurs: they will update the cumulative and marginal transactions between
the two agents and correspondingly decrease the number of the transaction
they can still perform until the end of the simulated three-maintenance pe-
riod. The class Market is an abstract class and is currently extended by two
child classes: LA Market for the lender-aggressor setting and BA Market for
the case of borrower-aggressors. While these two classes implement methods
to choose the aggressor agent of the transaction and its counterpart following
equations 1 and 2 (or equations 4 and 6 for the borrower-aggressor scheme),
the parent abstract class defines a method to perform a single transaction,
which automatically picks up a couple of agents with the correct probability
and updates all of their data members (cumulative and marginal transac-
tions, and transactions to be performed). This greatly simplifies the code of
the step() method in the Scheduler class, which essentially consists in itera-
tive calls to the single transaction method until the number of transactions
for both lender-aggressor and borrower-aggressor scheme is exhausted.
Appendix B. Rewiring
The networks simulated by the model can be compared with those rel-
ative to empirical data by using the rewiring procedure illustrated in Ref.
Hatzopoulos et al. (2013). Such procedure consists in a re-shuffling of data
that preserves the strength of each node. In Fig. B.10 we show the Con-
tour plots of the weighted Jaccard index of links between all pairs of three-
maintenance periods. The weighted Jaccard index has been introduced in
Ref. Hatzopoulos et al. (2013) and generalizes the usual Jaccard index as to
include the weight of each link. Here the weights are given by the number of
transactions between a pair of banks. The top-left panel shows the Jaccard
index between original networks. The top-right panel shows the weighted
Jaccard index between re-wired networks. The remaining left panels show
the weighted Jaccard index original networks simulated by the model with
full memory and w = 1, Q = 1 and w = 1, Q = 4 and w = 1 from top to
bottom. The right panels show the weighted Jaccard index for the original
simulated networks that have been subjected to a rewiring procedure.
By visual inspection one can notice that the set of parameters with Q = 4
or with full memory are those that better reproduce the empirical data. Thus
we confirm that empirical data are better reproduced when the memory
memory extends over the past, although it might perhaps be not necessary
to have a full memory as in the model of Section 2.
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Figure B.10: Contour plots of the weighted Jaccard index of links between all pairs of
three-maintenance periods for the lender-aggressor dataset. The top-left panel shows the
weighted Jaccard index between original networks relative to the short-term maturities.
The top-right panel shows the weighted Jaccard index of the corresponding rewired net-
works. The remaining left panels show the weighted Jaccard index original networks
simulated by the model with full memory and w = 1, Q = 1 and w = 1, Q = 4 and
w = 1 from top to bottom. The right panels show the weighted Jaccard index of the
corresponding rewired networks.
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